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In Hungary national level industrial relations developments are widely known: the taxi driver
blockade (1990), tripartite negotiations and agreements in the National Council for the
Reconciliation of Interests, the conflicts among the major trade union confederations
(1991-92) as well as the Social Security Board elections (1993) - all have been followed up
by and covered in the mass media. Much less is known - except for a couple of industrial
actions at some prominent enterprises - about enterprise level industrial relations, about the
direct contacts between employers, employees and unions at the level of business
organisations. What kind of changes occurred as a consequence of the overall economic and
political transformation? What is going on in the (past) big state owned companies -
privatized or facing privatization? In the rapidly growing private small and medium size
enterprises? In the plants of multinationals which have also appeared in the country and
established their production units - by purchasing state assets or carrying out "greenfield"
investments? What are the positions of the employees to fight for their interests in the new
conditions? Are these positions stronger or weaker than they were earlier? Do they have
their representative organisations and what the unions do? Where are the major lines of
labour disputes and conflicts and how are they settled? These questions, in our view, are of
utmost importance: albeit national level tripartism has far reaching consequences for
industrial and social peace, the relationship of employers and employees in the business
organisations is the direct foundation of their eventual conflicts and cooperation.
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Political versus economic determination
The present paper (and the research project and case studies ' it relies on) is to examine the
relationship between transformation, privatization and internal restructuring of the business
organisations - as an independent variable and enterprise level industrial relations - as a
"dependent variable"; it is to describe and to analyze the changes in the relations of
employers, employees and their organisations.
Privatization is conceived as an enterprise level (micro) process although ownership change
on this level cannot be treated separately from those national level (macro) processes -
marketization, macro economic stabilisation, privatization - which are engined by govern-
mental economic programmes and policies.
Similarly, industrial relations are also investigated as an enterprise level phenomenon:
(micro) developments in the business organisation, however, seem to be related to the
movements in national level industrial relations and in the national political arena as well as
(labour) legislation.
The business organisation (in the emerging political democracy and market economy) enjoys
more and more autonomy: it means that it is increasingly independent to shape its internal
organizational and management structures, business policies and strategies and industrial
relations, i.e. the relationship between the employer (management), employees and unions
on its own.
In the above context two fundamental questions emerge for the researcher:
1. What was the relative importance of economic versus political determination in
enterprise level industrial relations developments?
' The multinational comparative project "Enterprise level industrial relations, restructuring and
privatization" is carried out with the assistance of the British ESRC (Economic and Social
Research Council) and coordinated by the University of Kent. Its coordinator in Hungary is L.
Héthy. The case studies have been prepared by Gy. Kaucsek (MALÉV), P. Simon (DUNA-
FERR), F. Ternovszky and M. Adorján (Comasec-Respirator)
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2. What measure of enterprise autonomy could be perceived in the reshaping of
industrial relations on this level?
These questiuns are to test those wide spread hypotheses in the field of industrial relations
changes according to which political transformation (towazds pluralistic democracy) and
economic transformation (towazds mazket economy) are to result 1) in a withdrawal of
politics from the economy and the business organisations and 2) in an increased autonomy of
business organisations in shaping their internal structures. While these hypotheses seem to be
well founded in the long run, it is an open question: to what extent aze they valid in the
short run, in the critical initial period of change?
































Privatization and industrial relations
Privatization is looked upon as a prerequisite of transformation towards market economy.
As for the relationship of enterprise transformation and privatization on the one hand, and
enterprise level industrial relations, on the other two (closely interrelated) questions emerge:
1) to what extent are transformation and privatization (their way and consequences) a subject
of industrial relations. In other words: do the employees (trade unions) have any influence
over this process? 2) What is the impact by transformation and privatization on industrial
relations at the enterprise? Below we will discuss the possible answer to the first, in the rest
of the paper to the second question.
Hungary has had its own particular way in privatisation: its original philosophy being the
selling out of state assets to home and foreign investorsZ. The process, having its roots in
the development of small private firms in the early 1980s, was speeded up by the Economic
Association Act (1988) and the Transformation Act (1989).
Ownership change in the state sector has had two distinct periods: until 1990 privatization
was initiated and realized by the state enterprises themselves (it was the so called "sponta-
neous privatization");3 since 1990 (when the State Property Agency was established and
transformed into a governmental agency) privatization has been controlled by the govern-
ment; on the one hand the SPA's approval has been needed for privatization deals initiated
and prepared by the enterprises; on the other hand, the SPA itself has initiated and imple-
mented privatization programmes. Technically the process was realized in such a way that in
the first phase the state enterprise was transformed into an economic association (a limited
2 Stark, D.: Path Dependence and Privatization Strategies in East Central Europe East
European Politics and Societies. Vol 6. No 1. Winter, 1992; Bartlett, D.: The Political Economy
of Privatization: Property Reform and Democracy in Hungary. East European Politics and
Societies. Vol 6. No 1. Winter 1992.
' For the initial phase of privatization and debates about it see: Marer, P.: Transformation of
a Centrally Directed Economy: Ownership and Privatization in Hungary during 1990. In: Dallago,
B. et al (Eds): Privatization and Entrepreneurship in Post-Socialist Countries. Economy. Law and
Society.
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liability company or share company) and in the second phase it was sold (partly or fully) to
investors. The present Government, after it took into office (1990) envisaged the
privatization SOqo of state owned industry and trade until 1994. (Until now 15-209'0 of state
assets have actually been given to private hands). Governmental decisions identified those
enterprises that would be kept in state property in the long run - to control these companies
a State Property Management Holding was set up (1992) - and also those in which the state
was to maintain its majority ownership. (LRI, the Air Traffic and Airport Directorate -
closely related to MALÉV - belongs to the first group, while MALÉV itself into the second
group of these companies.)
The original phiiosophy of Hungarian privatizaíion, l.e. tl-le seiling af state assets has
somewhat loosened up in the meantime - because of difficulties in finding proper investors
and of political reasons - and new ways of privatization (MRP - ESOP, Small Investors'
Stock Ownership Programme etc.) have also appeared on the scene.
The three past big state owned enterprises discussed in the present paper - all of them
"flagships" of the past socialist economy - can be found in differing stages of ownership
change:
MEDICOR (producing medical equipment and employing about 5000 people in its numerous
plants in the 1980s) was the first state enterprise to be transformed into an economic
association in 1988; from the transformation it hoped the consolidation of its financial
position and the improvement of its competitiveness. The new organisation was a holding:
the past enterprise headquarters retained a partial ownership (together with some commercial
banks) in the plants which were turned into share companies. It was in this way too how the
plant investigated was transformed into a share company in 1988 and (partly) sold to a
French investor in 1990. In the joint company called Comasec-Respirator, both the
Hungarian and French owners have 50-50 ~o share.
MALÉV (Hungarian Airlines) employs 4500 people; its privatization started in 1991192; the
process had two stages: at first the airplane maintenance plant was separated from the
company and on its basis a new American-Hungarian joint venture - named Aeroplex - was
established: it was to take care of MALÉV's orders of maintenance and to attract orders
from other customers in the market too. In 1992 the privatisation of the air company itself
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began; at first it was turned into a so called uni-person (state) share company and afterwards
35 9'o if its shares were sold to a foreign investor (ALITALIA): the deal was completed in
1993 (when ALITALIA actually paid the price).
DUNAFERR (earlier Danube Iron Works), employing 11500 people, was a typical highly
centralized big state company until the end of the 1980s; it was the child of the rapid
socialist industrialisation of the 1950's based on the development of heavy industry
(primarily metallurgy and steel). In 1988189 - it was given a new type of organisation: its
plants were transformed into limited liability companies in which the (earlier) company
headquarters had (full or partial) ownership. (It had such ownership in 46 such limited
companies and other business organisations.) The headquarters retained close control (in the
field of finances, investments etc) over its (earlier) units. In 1992 the enterprise group was
transformed into a share company in which the state remained the sole owner except for one
or two joint ventures. ('I'he first of them, DUNAFERR-VOEST Alpine, was established in
1991).4
In the initial period of privatization (1988-92) the employees (and their representative
organisations) - according to some experts - were in too weak position to have an influence
over the process;S this state of affairs was equally due to the general uncertainties as to
trade unions rights (to be dealt with in more details later on) and to the confusion as to
workers' participation in decisions in this field:
1. According to earlier labour legislation (preceding the new Labour Code, 1992) trade
unions (in fact Shop Steward Committees) had a wide range of codecision and
consultation rights in enterprise level decision making having a relevance for the
working and living conditions of employees: legislation, however, did not (and could
' Compare the transformation (and privatization) process of DUNAFERR with those of
another giant of Hungarian steel industry, Lenin Metallurgical Works. Burawoy, M. - Lukács, J.:
The Radiant Past. Ideology and Reality in Hungary's Road to Capitalism. The Univ. of Chicago
Press, Chicago, 1992.
S Neumann, L.: Privatizáció és foglalkoztatás. (Privatization and Employment) Európa Fórum,
Vol. 2. No 4. Dec. 1992. p. 4. Bartlett op.cit.
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not) make mention of transformation and privatization, although its provisions were
applicable in this field too.
2. Enterprise Councils - these institutions of enterprise self-management including also
workers representatives - were (had to be) reelected in Autumn 1990 and continued
to live on until the state company was transformed into economic association and the
latest till the end of 1992. Enterprise Councils, at least according to the law, were
powerful institutions: they were in the position to define the enterprise's business
strategy, to elect and fire its chief executive etc.b Most Hungarian enterprises had
such councils, except for those under direct control by the government (for the latter
an example was MALÉV).
7 TL... A,. L`,.....,...,.:.. A.. It A00` -,] T-..-..C.,-~,..:..- I1 AOA~ ...7.,~. iiic r~~t5 vïi i:.~vu~iiii~ ri~SvCiátivïis ~iyoo~ Fuiu iiaii~i~iii~a~ivii ~1707~ iiiauc nv
mention of workers' participation in privatization; legislation however prescribed
Supervisory Boards for economic associations employing more than 200 people, the
third of their members were to be selected from among the representatives of
workers.
4. A Governmental decree to regulate workers' say in privatization was issued at the
end of 1991. It obliged the management (and the Enterprise Council) of the state
enterprise as well as the management of the economic association to inform the
employees about the transformation and privatization process with special emphasis
on ïts wage, social and welfare consequences as well as the possibilities of employ-
ees' ownership.'
As it is obvious from the above description workers' participation in decisions concerning
privatization has been guaranteed, at least in principle, by a set of institutions (Shop Steward
6 For the rights of Enterprise Councils see: Governmental Decree No 33I1984 (31th Nov.) on
the Implementation of Act No VI11977 on State Enterprises. Tdrvények és Rendeletek Hivatalos
Gyíljteménye. I. kótet. Kbzgazdasági és Jogi K. Budapest, 1985. 251-258. old. For a detailed
description see: Héthy, L. - Csuhaj, V.I.: Labour Relations in Hungary. Institute of Labour
Research, Budapest 1990. Enterprise Councils, in the representation of workers too, were
dominated by managers. Héthy L.: Plant level participation in Hungary. Osterreichische Zeitschift
fiir Soziologie, Wien, No 1. 1988.
' Governmental Decree No 119I1991 (12th Dec.) on Workers' Say in the Transformation of
State Enterprises and the Privatization of State Assets. Magyar Kózlóny No 99~1991
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Committees, Enterprise Councils, Supervisory Boards etc.) and legal provisions: in practice,
they have offered wide manoeuvring space for those forces (the enterprise management and
later the SPA) which have been in the actual control of privatization.
From the point of employees' say in privatization it is essentia] to know where decisions are
born.
Until 1990, in the period of so called spontaneous privatization such decisions were basically
taken at the level of the enterprise. Since 1990 - when the State Property Agency (SPA) was
established - the decision making authority has been shifted over to the government (the
branch ministries and the SPA itself). It was a special contradiction of this situation that on
the one hand, it was the SPA's right to decide but it was the enterprise management's (or
Enterprise Council's) responsibility to keep the workers informed.g The SPA could force
the enterprise's management to proceed with this duty, while the agency itself was obliged
only to produce written answers to comments by trade unions and "if necessary" to receive
their representatives in person. Today it is difficult to tell what guarantees (if any) have been
built in into the privatization process as for its social and employment consequences: the
probability of such efforts on the part of the SPA has been questioned, according to experts,
by its policies aimed at the maximization of budgetary income from privatization.9 The
trade unions possibility to delegate one representative into the SPA's Board of Directors and
the existence of the NCRI's Privatization Subcommittee did not compensate for the close
limits of employees' influence either.'o
8 According to Governmental Decree No 119I1991 the management's duty was fulfilled in the
case if the plan for the transformation and privatization of the enterprise had been subscribed by
the employee' representatives before its submission to the SPA.
9 Neumann, L. op. cit. Neumann, L.: Munkaugyi kapcsolatok - vállalati uzemi szinten.
(Labour relations - on enterprise, plant level) Manuscript. (Abbreviated published version:
Munkaugyi Szemle, Budapest, No 6. 1993)
'o The privatization process has evaded social control in general: SPA decisions could not be
disputed in court and all parliamentary efforts to control the SPA have met with failure.
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The Hungarian trade unions - both the reformed old and the newly formed ones - have
assumed a positive attitude towards market oriented economic change: they considered
privatization and its social consequences, such as growing unemployment as inevitable.
Although views of MSZOSZ, the League or MOSZ (Workers Councils) - these confeder-
ations will be described in were detail later on - differed somewhat, the three trade union
confederations raised claims for privatization in three major identical issues as early as 1990:
a) the proper treatment of its social (employment) consequences b) employees' participation
in the related decision making, c) possibilities for employees to acquire property."
At the three companies it was impossible to explore to what extent (if at all) employees, i.e.
...,.a,. .ia -n. ..r,. -~ ~. ,c-~ -.-
ttauc uïlioïlS Coitiu illutieilCe traïl~lUrlllatlUrl d11U prlvatlLatlt)rl: Wlecl 1I11UC1Ilat1Ui1 1S exlreÏIlCly
limited, although it was reported that there had been consultations between management and
workers's representatives. At the same time there exist meaningful indirect information: in
issues considered to be of importance also by the national trade union confederations, such
as the maintenance of employment and the opening up of possibilities for employees' stock
ownership, obvious signs of impact by the workers' representatives could be perceived.
In the context of these cases the presentation of employees and unions as victims of
privatization without any influence over it after 1990 does not seem to be properly justified.
1. Both MALÉV and DUNAFERR maintained their employment level in the period
investigated: no mass lay-offs or significant cuts in labour took place at the two
companies, although both suffered of overemployment (redundant labour); when the
staff was slightly reduced the managements applied such methods and techniques
which were the least painful for labour. Certain privatization contracts, e.g. those of
Aeroplex and DUNAFERR VoestAlpine, as reported, contained guarantees against
radical cuts. (Radical decline in employment has taken place, however, at Comasecl-
Respirator since its privatization in 1990.)
2. At both MALÉV and DUNAFERR employees' stock ownership programmes have
been worked out (by joint efforts by the management and the unions) and approved
" Neumann, L.: Privatizáció, munkavállalók, szakszervezetek (Privatization, employees,
unions) Társadalmi Szemle, No 1011991. p. 43-44.
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by the State Property Agency and State Property Management Holding. This
programme of MALÉV, at the pressure by the labour organisations, has been left
open also for those past employees of the company who were transferred to Aero-
plex.12
Industrial relations: actors and institutions
In 1989192, in the context of general political and economic change, a profound transform-
ation of industrial relations actors and institutions took place.13 The major developments
can be summed up as follows:
1. Trade unions were pluralized and transformed: newly formed "alternative", "inde-
pendent" unions appeared on the scene (1988-89) which later on united to form the
League (the Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions) and MOSZ (the
National Alliance of Workers' Councils); the dependence of (reformed) old unions
on the (party) state arrived at an end; the past monopolistic national trade union
centre ceased to exist: its member organizations assumed more decentralized and
1z In MALÉV's 7,5 billion HUF basic capital 5 9'o share is reserved (by the State Property
Management Holding) for stocks available for employees; the selling price of the stocks is fixed at
200 ~o of the face value which is reduced however by SOqo; a further privilege for employees is
that they have to pay only 25 ! of the price right away; the time period for full payment is fixed
in 3 years (the interests of the credit, however, are lower than that of the National Bank). Stocks
can be purchased also in exchange of so called "compensation vouchers" (accepted at their face
value plus interests). The employees' stock's circulation is limited: for a 5 year period the State
Property Management Holding has the right to repurchase the stocks when sold. Employees are
entitled to buy stocks to a limit of the annual sum of their wages or salaries and maximum up to
140 thousand HUF. (The minimum limit is fixed at 40 thousand HUF.) MALÉV trade unions
fought for a somewhat higher ratio (10 ~o) of employee shares in the capital so that they could
delegate a representative to the Board of Directors and for more favourable conditions. HVG (Heti
Világgazdaság) Budapest, 16th October 1993. p. 105.
" For details see: Héthy, L.: Hungary's Changing Labour Relations System. In: Labour
Relations in Transition in Eastern Europe. (Ed. Gy. Széll) De Gruyter, Berlin-New York, 1992.;
Lad6, M.: Workers and Employers' Interests - as they are Represented in the Changing Industrial




In Spring 1990 seven trade union confederations dominated the labour scene
(existing also in our days): MSZOSZ (National Association of Hungazian Trade
Unions). ASZOK (Autonomous Trade Unions' Confederation) and SZEF (Trade
Unions' Cooperation Forum) - the three major confederations uniting old (reformed)
unions - as well as the League, MOSZ (Workers Councils), ÉSZT (Trade Union
Association of Intellectual Workers) and Solidarity.
2. The transformation of employers speeded up in the context of privatization and the
development of the private sector.
3. A tripartite National Council for the Reconciliation of Interests (NCRI) was estab-
lisheri ~t9Rg~ .,~,irh rt;e n~2-tici ation of the labour and cm io--er or a~~i~atiuns and the.- . r~ p p Y g-- -
government: at first its functions were limited to the field of wage determination,
afterwards - when confirmed by the Antall Government ( 1990) - it was given wider
authority in the formulation of public policy, the reconstruction of the industrial
relations institutions and the preparation of labour legislation.'S ('The legal founda-
tions for the NCRI itself were provided by the new Labour Code.)
4. The new Labour Code (1992)16 - and already the amendments of the old one
(1989) - pulled down those legal obstacles which had seriously hindered free
collective bargaining in the past decades; the Strike Act (1989) provided the (earlier
missing) regulation of collective labour disputes. The rights were coupled with new
economic manoeuvring space, as past administrative wage determination by the state
- setting strict limits for both partners in bargaining - was gradually loosened up and
finally abolished (1989-92).
14 Decentralization included disposal over financial resources. Dunaferr trade union members-
hip fees (representing 1 9'0 of wages and salaries) are divided as follows: 50 qo remains with the
local trade union organisation, 10-10 ~o are transferred to the strike fund and to insurance while
30 ~1o is paid to the branch federation of Iron Workers (10 ! of which goes to MSZOSZ).
15 For compazative details, see: Héthy, L.: Tripartism in Central (Eastern) Europe: its chances
and limits. In: (Ferner, A. and Hyman, R. Eds.): New Frontiers in European Industrial Relations.
Blackwell, London (forthcoming)
16 Munkatdrvénykányv. 1992. évi XXII. Tórvény. (Labour Code, Act No XXII. 1992)
Magyar Kózldny. 1992. május 4. In English; Labour Law Documents, ILO, Geneva, No 1. 1993.
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Trade unions (considered to be representative) were given the right to negotiate and
conclude collective agreements on the part of labour.
5. Works Councils, new institutions of enterprise level workers' participation in
decision-making, were set up and endowed with (mostly) consultation functions by
the new Labour Code. Their actual election (May 1993), however, followed up the
relevant labour legislation (May 1992) with one year delay. In the meantime those
earlier institutions of workers participation which had been provided with more
extended authority, disappeared from the scene (such as Enterprise Councils)".
The transformation of industrial relations was gravely burdened by political struggles:
conflicts flared up among the (new and reformed old) trade union confederations as well as
between the labour organisations, the government and the parliament (political parties).18
The seven trade union confederations joined the NCRI in 1990 and cooperated in relative
peace. ('To coordinate their activities a Trade Union Round Table was set up by them). In
Spring 1991 their relationship - primarily the contacts of MSZOSZ, on one hand, and the
League and the Workers Councils, on the other - deteriorated to the extent that the Trade
Union Round Table ceased to function. The major issues of conflicts were the redistribution
of trade union assets, legitimacy and representativeness. A positive turn took place as late as
Autumn 1992 when six major confederations arrived at an agreement as to the (partial)
redistribution of assets.19
" For Enterprise Councils also see: Mak6, Cs.: Enterprise councils in Hungary: Tools of
Management or Tools of Workers? KOSMOS. (?)
'a For more details, see: Héthy, L.: Political Changes and the Transformation of Industrial
Relations in Hungary. IIRA 9th World Congress, 30 Aug. - 3 Sept. Sydney, Proceedings Volume
No 4. Deppe, R.: The Trade Union Perspective within the Process of Change in the former GDR
and Hungary. (In German: Institut fiir Sozialforschung, Frankfurt, Mitteilungen No 1. Aug. 1992)
19 The confederation Solidarity refused to join the agreement. Solidarity later on was excluded
also from the NCRI by the other confederations, for its extremist policies.
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The reformed old labour organisations (primarily MSZOSZ) got sharply confronted with the
Government (and the legislation) in Summer 1991, as the parliament - in lack of agreement
among the labour confederations - passed an act about the trade union assets: it obliged the
unions to report on their assets, sequestered those assets, blocked union funds and estab-
lished a body as a provisional caretaker of those assets and funds.~
The intervention by the legislation was welcomed by the newly formed unions, while the
traditional unions protested sharply and labelled the acts as unconstitutional and politically
discriminatory. The uncertainty created by the political struggles was coupled by the
uncertainty of trade union rights: in Summer 1991 the earlier co-decision rights of unions
were annulled by the Constitutional Court, while the new trade union rights were laid down
- after much debate - as late as Spring 1992 by the new Labour Code.
The representativeness of trade unions were subjected to repeated tests by the parliament. In
Summer 1991 an act21 required that check-off authorizations by union members be con-
firmed by those members. (Traditional unions mostly applied this method to collect their
membership fees.) In 1993 the elections of the trade union members of Social Security
Boards as well as- with considerable delay - the elections of Works Councils took place.~
In this process the reformed traditional unions - MSZOSZ, ASZOK etc - suffered certain
losses, but retained their predominance, while the newly formed unions - the League and the
Workers Councils - could also prove a certain representativeness. (Appendix)
In general the trade unions' transformation (and struggles) were associated with a decline in
density: the level of unionization, estimated to be between 40 and 60 ~o in the country, still
~ 1991. évi XXVIII. Tbrvény. (Act No XXVIII. 1991) Magyar Kózldny, 1991 jul. 17. (In
English: Labour Law Documents, ILO, Geneva, No 3. 1991).
21 1991. évi XXIX. Tórvény (Act No XXIX. 1991) Magyar Kózl'ány, 1991. jul. 17. (In
English; Labour Law Documents, ILO, Geneva, No 3. 1991) At DUNAFERR 99 3b of the trade
union membership renewed their authorizations, while this ratio was lower at the two other
companies.
~ In public services Public Servant Councils were elected.
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could be qualified as rather high, if compazed with most Western European industrialized
mazket economies.
The trade unions' presence was part of the "legacy" of the three (past state-owned) com-
panies which we covered in our case studies.~
In two companies - MALEV and DUNAFERR - the national pluralisation of the labour
organisations was reproduced, but the unions suffered only slight losses in membership. At
MALEV the reformed old union survived (it was thought to be affiliated with MSZOSZ~;
two new unions were established (they were thought to be affiliated with the League); one of
them moved over to the Hungarian-American joint venture Aeroplex engaged in the
maintenance of the airplanes; there existed also two further unions - those of pilots and
stewardslstewardesses - which did not belong to any national confederation. Similarly, at
DUNAFERR the old Iron Workers Union - affiliated with MSZOSZ- continued to function
and also local organisations of the League, the Workers Councils and Solidazity were
established. It was a particulaz feature of this company that the Youth Organisation - a
successor of the (past) Communist Youth Organisation - also survived as a union: it had
"patronising" members who simultaneously belonged to (other) union(s). In the (past)
MEDICOR plant there existed only one labour organisation: it joined the Iron Workers
Federation (and MSZOSZ).
~ It seems to be a general trend that trade unions survived at (transformed or privatized) state
companies; the absence of unions is limited to a smaller group of companies where the employer
assumed (hidden) anti-unionist policies ("closed shops" being unlawful according to labour
legislation) or where the employees seem to have no interest in joining to form unions (e.g. in
case of greenfield investments for which an example is Ford's plant in Western Hungary). In
practice it is very difficult to judge what is really going on in such cases. (There are examples of
union organisation in greenfield investments too: at Hungazian Suzuki e.g. the Iron V~'orkers union
is engaged in efforts to recruit members.)
~` The MALEV trade unions were cautious to openly reveal their affiliations: by this secrecy
they probably tried to evade biases in politics and public opinion.
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The establishment of new trade unions at the Hungarian enterprises seemed to follow up
three possible scenarios.~ 1) The employees joined to form a new union: at the same time
(or even earlier) the old union ceased to exist; 2) the new labour organisation was formed in
a definite group of employees or organisational unit with well-defined distinct interests of
their own while the old union survived in other groups or units 3) the new union appeared
on the scene, but the old union also continued to function and it often retained even its
predominance. For cooperation among the individual labour organisations the third version
was the most critical and conflictual: it was according to this last scenario how the
pluralisation of workers' representation began at both MALEV and DUNAFERR: later on a
shift took place into the second scenario and it was in this way how the trade union situation
consolidated at both companies-
At the two big companies the establishment of the new unions most probably reflected the
presumable strategies of their national confederations~ - beyond the local initiative - to get
foothold in such business organisations which were covered by the mass media and in this
way to build up their public support. Such strategies seemed to be very reasonable as the
new trade unions started to function in a disadvantageous position - if compared with the old
ones - as for their human, organisational and financial resources and they could hope success
only from the concentration of these limited resources on well-chosen battle-fields. At first it
was thought that developments in the trade union stage would follow up those in the political
arena i.e. the traditional unions would collapse or at least get in the minority like the
successors of the Communist Party (HSWP) which were defeated in the 1990 elections. The
events, however, took a differing course: the new trade unions were not given the opportun-
ity to secure their legitimacy and to prove their representativeness by a single action: it has
taken years of struggles for them to do so.
~ Kameniczky, I.: Munkavállalói érdekképviseletek egyuttmukódése. (Cooperation among
trade unions). ILO Expert Group on IR Development in Hungary. Aug. 1992. (Manuscript)
~ Developments seem to indicate that new trade unions had limited interest in declining
economic branches (such as metallurgy, mining) while their primary targets were those with solid
perspectives (such as transport).
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At ComaseclRespirator no alternative labour organisations appeared on the scene: there was
no local initiative to organize them. The local Iron Workers union retained its monopoly to
represent the workers' interests; the level of unionization - unlike the two other companies -
however sharply declined, from the earlier 85-90 9'o to 25 ~o; there were changes in the
composition of the membership too: managers and white collar workers - unlike the two
other enterprises once again -left the union: the staff the new influential commercial
department - developed in the conditions of marketization - did not join it either.
In May 1993 Works Council elections took place at the three companies (and all over the
country); these elections had a double importance: 1) they made it possible for the unions to
prove their representativeness; at enterprise level 10 R'o of the votes (or Works Council
seats) was needed for a union - according to the law - to be qualified as representative;
representativeness, at the same time, was a precondition for the availability of certain trade
union rights (such as the protection of trade union officers) 2) they opened up the possibility
for (the) representative trade union(s) to enter collective negotiations and to sign the
collective agreement: to be in such a position the union(s) had to achieve SO~o of the votes
(or Works Council seats).27
The Works Council election results were as follows:
MSZOSZ member organisations proved to be most successful at the three companies: these
unions went beyond the minimum limit of representativeness and got into the position to
bazgain and sign collective agreements; newly formed unions very often failed to surpass
such minimums. At DUNAFERR the results of the individual unions were the following:
Iron Workers Union 80,3 9ó, Youth Organisation 11,3 ~fo, Workers' Councils 3,2 Í,
Commercial and Financial Workers Union 0,7 9'0, independent candidates 4,5 3'0. In
MALEV's five Works Councils four were occupied by the candidates of the reformed old
union, while in the fifth the organisation considered to be close to the League and a
non-affiliated union won seats. At ComaseclRespirator the Works Council became domi-
nated once again by the Iron Workers union.
~ Until the Works Council elections all trade unions were provided with the right of
bazgaining and signing collective agreements by the interim legislation.
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The success of MSZOSZ (and its member organisations) created special - strong - positions
for the trade unions of the enterprises: it became obvious that the rights of both bargaining
and (indirectly) of participation would be exercised by labour organizations relying on a
developed national organizational structure, on a similar network of activists, on consider-
able experience and competence as well as on important positions in public policy formula-
tion ( in the NCRI, the Social Security Boards etc.) In this way the employer - let it be state,
private or quasi-private - would be faced both in collective bargaining and (indirectly)
workers participation with the same union: in this set-up the chance would be very limited
that one union could be played off against another or the labour organisation(s) could be
"domesticated" or "privatized" ( i.e. separated from the national confederation). On the
contrary: there is a t;ood chance that workers' renrecentatinn and pa.~tflcipat.on ~~.~oald ber
coordinated - perhaps both following up a nationally set scenario in a sense.
A precondition is, however, the close cooperation of MSZOSZ and its unions which did not
seem to be present at the three companies.~
Further questions are: what level of influence can be achieved via participation taking into
account the Works Council's weak (mostly consultative)~ legal authority and how success-
ful the unions can be in the actual process of collective bargaining?
At the three companies no new collective agreements were concluded in the period investi-
gated: there were negotiations, but those old collective agreements remained in force -
repeatedly prolonged and modified - which had been arrived at within the framework of the
past state-owned enterprise with the past management in the earlier era. These collective
contracts, which had been hurriedly signed in view of the coming changes, provided more
extended protection for workers against dismissals (in terms of severance pay and the length
of period of notice) than current labour legislation. It had been normal on the part of the
~ In Hungary enterprise level trade unions are independent legal entities over which both
federations and confederations have very limited control.
~ The Works Council, as regulated by the Labour Code, is endowed with co-decision right in
two issues: a) the disposal over social welfare funds and assets (as regulated in the collective
agreement) b) the regulation of labour safety.
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unions to stand up for such strong guarantees; on the part of the management the acceptance
of these guarantees could be explained by negligence but also by cunning preparation for the
(uncertain) future: managers themselves - as employees - were covered by these collective
agreements too. In 1992, in the collective negotiations in a basically new situation, there
were efforts by the employer - both at MALEV and DUNAFERR - to reduce provisions in
the collective agreements to the minimum standards of labour law.~ Instead of (wider)
collective agreements, however, only narrow annual partial agreements (on wage increases,
employment) were concluded.
The enterprises: economic situation, conflicts and cooperation
In 1991~92 all of the three companies, as to their current economic and financial situation,
belonged to that group of Hungarian business organisations which, partly as a result of good
luck and partly of their efforts, could remain above water. MALEV was successful in
exploiting chances offered by international politics: it had an important share in the transport
of Jewish emigrants to Israel from the (past) USSR; it continued to fly to the Middle East
even in the risky period of the Gulf War, it earned profits on the (for a time still) cheap
Soviet kerosene. ComaseclRespirator was also given such orders by the Gulf War which
made possible for it to sell its stocks and boost (even if provisionally) its production.
DUNAFERR, as the country's technologically most developed steel work producing good
quality steel, could sell its products both at home - after its rivals collapsed - and abroad.
This success, however, proved to be short-term, as it was due to transitory boom (and to its
~ In the first half of 1993 there existed 380 enterprise level collective agreements covering
580 thousand employees. ('The numbers are roughly equal with those of 1992.) 60 R'o of these
agreements (in terms of the number of enterprises) contained provisions for average wage growth
and 80 ~o for the growth of basic wages. (The rate of negotiated wage growth averaged about
16-17 3'0; it was in line with forecasts as to the increase of consumer prices but would be
previsibly inferior as to the actual rate of inflation); 40 3'0 of the agreements provided for a
minimum wage above the legal guaranteed minimum (by an average 10 ~o) and regulated wage
scales. In manufacturing 35 9'0 of the employees were covered by collective agreements; this ratio
was much higher - about 70 90 - in transport, telecommunication and postal services dominated
mostly by big companies. Tájékoztató a keresetalakulás és a kollektfv bérmegállapodás jel-
lemz8ir81, 1993. I. félévi adatok alapján. (A durvey of wages and collective wage agreements on
the basis of data in the first half of 1993). Ministry of Labour, Budapest, Sept. 1993.
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exploitation by the managements) and had little to do with efforts to overcome the basic
structural problems of the three companies. In 1993 MALEV ended with a serious deficit
and DUNAFERR was also faced with grave difficulties (as a result of the recession in
Western Europe and of the Jugoslav embargo).
For the companies three interrelated economic processes set challenge calling for profound
structural change: 1) marketization, 2) recession and 3) privatization. By marketization we
mean the elimination of the earlier shelter by the state and the exposure to the impact of the
market, i.e. a process involving both possibilities and constraints. The Hungarian market
was opened up for imports, price and wage determination was considerably liberalized and
ctate cubci[iiPg ri~t alrPady by thP NbrrPt}~ GnYern;,2ent f1QR~-9~.~ a,T:d ta~l.o. Trnroec 11oc`a i v ~ ~IlV~rWJ f4J
continued since 1990. In this context the business organisations got rid of administrative
obstacles in price setting: they became free to realize their costs in their sales, but they were
mostly prevented to do so by the shrinking internal market and the growing competition.
The decline in home demand, the collapse of Comecon trade (among the past socialist
countries) coupled with the recession in Western Europe touched upon very heavily on
manufacturing (including engineering) and steel industry. Economic processes within the
country - the lasting drop in GDP and industrial output" - were also engined by the
restrictive economic (fiscal and monetary) policies of the recent governments aimed at the
restoration and maintenance of the balances of the economy and - after all - at macro
economic stabilisation.32 Transformation and privatization also appeared as an opportunity
to survive and as a must: the firms were pushed to go on this way by legislation and often
also by governmental will (for which MALEV was a typical example). Exposure to the
market meant an especially sharp challenge for the small Comasec~Respirator, it had an
increasing impact on MALÉV as it had to function in strong international competition and
DUNAFERR too became faced with it.
" GDP and industrial output have continuously declined since 1990 and 1989 respectively. In
1991 GDP drop was 11,9 ~o while that of industrial output 19,1 3~ (Data by the UN European
Economic Committee. Heti Világgazdaság, Budapest, 15th May 1993. p. 27.)
32 For details, see: OECD Economic Surveys. Hungary 1993. OECD Paris 1993.
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The "strategies of survival" followed up by the three enterprises were differing, but had
similarities. There was a general effort to adopt to the market, to improve the quality of
products and services, to develop marketing activities and to involve Western know-how and
to achieve technological development (with foreign capital injections) to come closer to the
tazgets set. Organisational changes (in fact decentralization and disintegration) - primarily at
MEDICOR and DUNAFERR - had several functions: to promote the profit orientation and
cost sensitiveness of units, to prepaze privatization etc. All of the three companies tried to
attract foreign capital: for DUNAFERR it was considered to be important to continue its
programme of technological development (in the framework of which its outdated Siemens--
Martin steel work had already been closed down.) For MALÉV it was also vital to get rid of
its outdated and aged Soviet Tupoljev aircrafts and to substitute them with up-to date and
new Western planes. The plant of MEDICOR hoped know-how and markets from the
French owner. While DUNAFERR had no capital, it had accumulated a hefty debt. For
MALEV the involvement of a foreign investor promised - beyond new purchases and
management methods - also such a"mazriage" which could provide a competitive size in the
international mazket (and also a possible development of Budapest Airport into a regional
centre of air transport, the possibility for overseas flights etc.)
The relationship between the employer (the management) and the labour organisations
developed on differing tracks at the three companies in the context of transformation and
privatization.
At MALEV in the contacts of management and unions periods of conflicts and cooperation
alternated with each other: at the same time relations among the individual unions were
seriously burdened by rivalry and competition to prove their militant determination to
represent the workers; the positions of the individual unions - those said to be affiliated with
MSZOSZ, the League and the non-affiliated ones - were strong and relatively balanced: of
the 3500 trade union members (the level of unionization was 80 9b) "only" 1500 belonged to
the traditional union, while the rest - in fact the majority - of them supported other labour
organisations. Debates - and confrontations - were concentrated on the below enlisted issues:
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1. The establishment of the American-Hungarian joint venture.
The employers and the trade union (said to be close to the League}33 were worried
about several problems: a) what chances will the JV have in the market if its
establishment does not involve technological development (and related capital
investment)? (Aeroplex mostly relies on the old building and equipment of MALÉV
rented to it.) b) What will be the consequences of the JV for work content and
working conditions? (Workers were alarmed by the possibility that Aeroplex would
be engaged in less qualified and lower paid work tasks - such as the repair of
aircraft bodies - due to its outdated technological equipment.) c) What impact will
the JV have on the income of employees? (They worried about their earlier overtime
wvrk, SccOndary jObS ánd u~c reiátru incui[ie). iilái !5 Wlly the bUS1neSS COntraCt
about the establishment of Aeroplex was much debated and criticized. Trade union
demands at the same time, probably had a positive role in the settlement of certain
problems: among others only a slight reduction of the labour force has taken place
and the JV's employees have been given the opportunity to buy MALEV shares.
The trade unions manoeuvring space, however, became limited by the establishment
of Aeroplex: its major background was the airplane maintenance unit, but it was cut
off from the mother company.
2. The reorganisation and rationalisation of the air company.
MALÉV's general director (appointed in 1990) was aware of the redundancies in
employment - a fact pointed out also by outside experts - and he had in mind its
reduction (by about 15 ~).
The trade unions considered mass lay-offs, in a most understandable way, a process
opposed to the interests of many employees and endangering their own positions at
the company too. They were worried that the management would proceed with it
without proper previous consultations with the unions and the whole process would
be mechanical, disregarding the much differing conditions and requirements of the
individual organizational units and would not result in the improvement of the
quality of the company's labour force. That is why the labour organisations' major
33 The trade union was assisted by experts sent out by the League.
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argument was that - before the management resorts to mass lay-offs - the company
itself should be reorganized to discover redundancies and clear criteria should be set
for the selection of people.
The conflict became extremely sharp and rude: the general director blamed the
unions for hindering inevitable and for the company's survival essential changes
while the unions retorted by attacking the "permanent reorganisation" of the
company, called for its end - in fact MALEV's organisation has hardly changed for
the past years - and at the same time they labelled the management "incompetent". It
was a minor (but typical) episode of 1991: the general director wrote a letter to the
Minister of Labour to explore possible assistance for the envisaged mass lay-off;
although the letter, by its nature, was confidential, the trade unions got hold of it
(via informal channels) and published it in the daily press as a"proof" that the
general director had decided about mass lay-offs without previously informing the
representatives of labour. The similarly rude reaction by the chief executive suffered
no delay.
The mass lay-off, however, was postponed: the new general director in 1993, in the
year of privatization, planned a slight reduction of 4 qo.
3. Employees' and union rights
Labour right disputes have occurred in great number since 1990 at the company. At
present we provide a couple of illustrative examples:
In 1992 one trade union sharply protested against the "excessive transgression" of
flying time limits in case of stewardesses; the management, however, claimed that
there were no such complaints on the part of the employees and the "excessive
transgression" meant one occasion in case of one stewardess who - on a voluntary
basis - undertook one additional flight to substitute a missing person and by it she
passed over the 100 hourlmonth limit by one hour. The same union demanded the
retraining of all stewardesses for service on B 767 planes to provide them with
"equal chances": at the same time the management argued that many stewardesses
were unwilling to undertake long distance flights. The trade unions made efforts to
maintain earlier trade union rights which had been annulled: such as to have a say in
the appointment of managers. In Autumn 1992, the company's traditional trade
union lodged a grievance against the management's decision about wage growth and,
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to lay a stress on it, it managed with strike. The management, following up the legal
rules, suspended its measure and convened a meeting of conciliation. The trade
union membership was unprepared and - as it felt that its wage growth was in
danger - it reacted negatively to the trade union action: as a result the union quickly
withdrew its complaint.
Labour disputes seem to have penetrated even workers participation. One of the
Works Councils, shortly after its election in Autumn 1993 took to court the general
director for his decision to close the company's holiday house at the Lake Balaton
for Winter and to dismiss the staff, without previous consultations with the Works
Council. In the body's views it had co-decision right in this issue.~
The company'c rrZ~r~agement Pmplnyarl a q~walified lahn,Yr lawyer (an e3r]ier labOL:r
court judge) as a human resource manager to be in good position in such debates and
to resist demands which very often had their origin in the misinterpretation or
ignorance of labour law on the part of the unions.
4. Wages and wage growth
Collective (interest) disputes and conflicts about wages started as early as 1990~91:
they led to industrial actions, however, only in 1993.
a) At the American-Hungarian joint venture the first wage negotiation took
place in Summer 1991: it was not initiated, in a paradox way, by the trade
union but directly by the employees: the workers themselves (worrying about
their overtime bonuses and secondary jobs) engaged in direct negotiations
with the Hungarian and American management and agreed that the annual
wage growth would be 21 lo .
b) At MALEV itself - although menaces of strike were repeatedly formulated in
the past years - the first warning strike took place in Summer 1993, after the
privatization of the company: the pilots demanded 70 R~ while the rest of the
staff asked for 50 9~ annual wage growth, but later they themselves reduced
~` Népszabadság, 8th Nov. 1993.
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their original claims and were granted somewhat less than half of it.'s
(It is important to note: in this case those groups of employees proved to be
successful in their struggle for higher wages among whom overemployment
was publicly known and whose positions in the labour market were not
really strong.)
c) At Aeroplex a second term of wage negotiations followed up in Summer
1993 leading to similar results: in their first stage the union demanded
almost 200 !o (!) wage growth for the coming 18 month period and the final
agreement - after 3 days actual strike - fixed 35 lo . This industrial action
was the first important strike case at a joint venture; the workers' demands
were primarily resisted by MALÉV management; MALÉV managed to bring
in Ukrainian and British repairmen to break down the action.~
At DUNAFERR both on the side of management and unions - as to their attitudes and
contacts - cooperation and continuity proved to have deeper roots than confrontation and
change.
The level of unionization remained at 80-90qo at the company. The Iron Workers' local
union (affiliated with MSZOSZ) - having 7000 members of 11500 employees at the company
- was predominant; the membership of other unions (the organisations of the League, the
Workers Councils and Solidarity) had no more than 1-200 members each. At first, in
1990191, their small size seemed to be compensated by their "voice", by the militant attitude
of their leaders: they sharply attacked the Iron Workers union on political and ideological
grounds and this organisation seemed be on the floor. But afterwards - as the national
positions of the reformed old unions gradually got consolidated - the Iron Workers union of
the company also became more active making use of its organisation, activists, connections,
's The pilots' demand was interpreted by the press and mass media as if they wanted Western
European wages: what they asked for was a correction in the hierarchy of wages; they demanded
a second place for themselves after top management, as it was the practice - they argued - at
Western air companies.
~ MALÉV's general director qualified the industrial action at the mother company as
"disciplined and moderate" while the workers of Aeroplex - in his views - resorted to the final
weapon too early and confused their partners by calling for unlimited strike. (Interview with A.
Pákay, MALÉV's general director, Népszabadság, 28 Sept. 1993.)
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experience and resources. In this period the trade unions' attitude towards the management
was basically determined by the - moderate and tolerant - cooperative policies of the old
Iron Workers.
DUNAFERR was free of such grave debates and conflicts between the employer(s) and the
union(s) which led to industrial action (except for one or two short warning strikes of two
hours e.g. at the Austrian-Hungarian joint venture, DUNAFERR-VOEST Alpine). Most
debates were concentrated on wages: actual wage growth, however, regularly surpassed
negotiated wage growth; the rates of actual increase were 24,5 9b in 1991 and 25,4 `Yo in
1992 while the negotiated rates were 20 and 22 3'o respectively. (Negotiated growth laid
dnwn in the L1TiT~TAFERR le;~el ;;'age agree:l~ent was obligátOïy I~r t}'ic iin'iited iiábiiity
companies, but the latter often went beyond them.) In a similar way, negotiated minimum
wage slightly exceeded the national guaranteed minimum wage: in 1993 it was fixed at 9500
HUFlmonth while the national minimum was 9000 HUFlmonth. The management main-
tained social welfare benefits: such measures, even if benefits assisted sometimes narrow
groups of workers, were looked upon as a positive gesture on the part of the employer (e.g.
the company provided 30 year interest free loan for the construction of apartments by the
workers.)
In the development of trade union strategies and activities managerial attitudes and efforts
also had a role. MALÉV's general director, who occupied his chair in 1990 was determined
to go through with his reorganisation and rationalisation programme (including the envisaged
mass lay-offs) regardless the resistance of the employees and trade unions to it; he firmly
belíeved that such changes were absolutely necessary to keep the company on the surface
and that he had the full support of the owner (the state, i.e. the Ministry); he was most
certainly disillusioned when - after a one year period - he had to resign and leave. His
attitude so much outraged certain trade union leaders - who have also left their posts in the
meantime - that they did not choose among the possible means of resistance and opposition:
their means ranged on a wide scale from political demagogy37 to personal attacks against
" When Aeroplex was estabiished, the trade unions tried to transform the basically economic
into a political matter; in a public statement they raised the question: "Whose interest is to give
Hungary's most important aircraft maintenance basis into foreign hands? In our view, it is not a
simple issue of business, but one of national security."
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the general director and other top managers. They accused the top management of alleged
corruption and immoral conduct of life. In 1991 even an official investigation was started
but yielded no result. The general director himself was not reserved in his conflicts with the
unions either: menaces with disciplinary procedure, retortions, inquiries alternated with each
other.
At DUNAFERR - although the "paternalist" general director of the earlier period was
removed in 1990 - the past traditions of "taking care of the workers", of close cooperation
with the labour union seemed to live on. To prove his willingness to cooperate, the new
general director refrained from attempts to change the collective agreement that had been
signed by his predecessor even if the atmosphere of the economic environment of the
enterprise had become rather chilly. From the point of its relations with the employees (and
the unions) the management's efforts to maintain the level of unemployment were of utmost
importance: the number of the labour force only slightly decreased in the period 1990193:
from 12500 to 11500 and the reduction of the employees was realized by means which were
the least painful for them (by the termination of employment of foreign labour, by reducing
overtime work, by administrative limitations on hiring new employees and by early
retirement. )
At Comasec~Respirator, although the trade union was present, there existed no articulate
trade union strategy; the labour organisation was passed unnoticed by such developments as
transformation and privatization or rationalisation and labour force reduction: the number of
its employees decreased from 260 in 1988 to 180 in 1992. The major guarantee for the
representation of workers interests, as we learned in our investigation was the "paternalist"
attitude of the Hungarian management and primarily of the chief executive. He made
repeated efforts to maintain the delicate balance between the (otherwise similarly paternalist)
French owner's demands for reduction in production costs and the tolerance of the
employees. As the workers aspirations (concerning their wages and income) were mostly
satisfied and they (at least those who remained) were grateful for the security of their jobs,
the chief executive became the generally accepted and respected key figure of the company's
industrial relations.
26
When MALÉV and DUNAFERR are compared it seems to be justified to distinguish
"conflictual" and "cooperative" industrial relations; still the dividing line between these two
were far from being distinct. It is true that sharp and open (as well as public) conflicts were
primarily characteristic of MALEV, but one should not forget that such clashes had their
limits both in time and space and in the relations of the management and the unions also the
elements of cooperation were present. In the first half of 1992, when the new general
director submitted his future plans to a trade union meeting to get reactions from the
workers' representatives, none of the targets set by him was questioned and the unions stood
up for good relations.
The above described event had been preceded by a joint declaratinn of rhe seven l~~,e,I-,ÉV
trade unions in August 1991: it sharply criticized the company's (resigned or dismissed)
general director for serious negligence (or even misconduct) in its relations with the
employees, for grave violations of labour law, for the exclusion of unions of information
vital for their effective functioning, for the generation of a climate of uncertainty of mass
lay-offs and for efforts to separate the members from their unions.
This first coordinated action by the trade unions made the management learn the importance
of workers representatives and negotiations with them: it reacted by an initiative of dialogue
about the most pressing topical issues. Afterwards the general director also decided to
receive two-two trade union representatives on the first Thursday of each month to "promote
a better flow of information". (This latter was a positive gesture reflecting, however, an
inequality of the partners.)
At MALÉV and DUNAFERR the managements in the new pluralised trade union situation
did not refuse dialogue with the trade unions, although the general political climate
and the uncertainties of trade union positions and rights opened up the way for such
an attitude in the period between Summer 1990 and Summer 1992;
maintained contacts with all labour organisations without marked preferences or
dispreferences; no efforts to discriminate or to eliminate any of the unions were
reported at the companies;
institutions for dialogue with the workers' representatives (so called local interest
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reconciliation bodies following up the example of the NCRI) were set up and
functioned at both companies, their functions were limited to information and
consultation.
At MALÉV the process of "reconciliation of interests" was meant to have several levels and
to follow up the hierazchy of decision making: when reading through the 1991 annual
reports of the deputy general directors - the procedure and institution were established in this
year - there is little or no mention of such activities. An explanation for it is offered by the
hierazchically upwazd movement of such exercises: the top managers as well as the lower
levels of management did their best to get rid of conflicts in which they had to take a side in
public: that is why they pushed such cases to upper levels. The trade unions, on their part,
were enthusiastic, in general, to generate company level problems out of often trifle local
tensions to be solved by the top management. The company level body of "reconciliation of
interests", in its turn, did not know what to do as to the problems of differing type and
importance it had to face and had no time and energy to concentrate on major issues
touching upon the whole of the company and its employees. To hand the "hot potato"
upward had been a well-known practice of the highly centralized past state owned enterprises
and it seemed to continue in the new situation too.
At both companies, despite periods of rivalry and clashes among the labour organisations,
there were efforts to unite for joint and coordinated action. To promote it DUNAFERR
unions established a Council of Interest Protection, while MALÉV unions created a Trade
Union Roundtable - both of them being trade union bodies. At the steel company the unions
concluded an agreement to secure the fairness of Works Council elections.3e At the air
company in August 1991 also a"crisis committee" was set up to exercise joint pressure on
the management. At both companies there was a more or less effective cooperation among
'g They agreed upon certain mutually accepted rules such as: they would not conclude special
agreements to defeat others, they would refrain from negative campaign, they would suspend the
recruitment of new members in the campaign period, they would engage in positive propaganda
for the Works Council and for their own organisation, they would limit the number of their
candidates so that the validity of the elections be guaranteed, on the day of voting even written
propaganda would be suspended, possible debates among them would be settled by negotiations
within three days and possible violations of their agreement would be made public.
28
the unions also in the bodies of "reconciliation of interests" - following up the example (or
rather the spirit) of the National Council for the Reconciliation of Interests.
In Hungary enterprise level industrial relations of the past decades had been chazacterized by
managementltrade union cooperation and by the lack of conflicts~ in the sense that strikes
had razely occurred and if they had they had been organized with the evasion of or despite
the disapproval of labour organisations.~ In 1988~92 the pillazs of such cooperation
collapsed in governmental economic and social policies, in the institutional framework of
industrial relations and labour legislation as well as in political and industrial relations
philosophies and ideologies." New possibilities opened up for both genuine cooperative
and conflictual industrial relations at the enterprises: in addition ~he nld and ne.v trade
unions were candidates for both roles. For the researcher it is an open question: what are
those conditions which still make enterprise level cooperation survive, even if in a modified
39 If the concept of cooperation is meant to indicate the relationship of autonomous partners in
more or less equal positions, it can be applied much better for the description of present and
future than past industrial relations of the enterprises.
`~ This situation is well illustrated by the case of slow-downs and work stoppages of RABA
(Hungazian Railway Carriage and Machine Works) as described in Héthy, L. - Mak6, Cs.:
Munkásmagatartások és a gazdasági szervezet. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1972 (In. English:
Patterns of Workers Behaviour and the Business Enterprise. Institute of Sociology and Institute of
Labour Reseazch, Budapest, 1989.)
" The major guazantees of such cooperative relations were as follows: 1) job security and
continuous (also modest) real wage growth (interrupted by yeazs of decline) were taken care of by
governmental economic policies; at the same time initiatives by the employers and trade unions
were limited (primazily by administrative wage determination by the state) 2) legislation of
industrial relations was supposed to promote cooperation between management and unions - it
preferred cooperative workers participation to conflictual collective bazgaining, providing
considerable rights in the first field (e.g. for Enterprise Councils) and limiting rights in the second
one. 3) Institutionalized (formal) bazgaining, however, was substituted by non-institutionalized
(informal) bargaining, at least by certain groups of labour in strong bazgaining positions: since
1982 the government made efforts to institutionalize (formalize) these (informal) transactions
within the institutions of entrepreneurship within and outside of the enterprises. 4) in official
ideology the concepts of "workers' ownership", of "higher level interests uniting both workers
and managers" as well as of the "common interests of socialist construction" were supposed to
confirm this cooperation too. For the changes see: Mak6, Cs.: From State Corporatism to Divided
Unionism? Vienna Institute for Advanced Studies. Vienna 1992. (manuscript)
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form. The hypothetical explanation which is relevant at least for a part of the Hungarian
enterprises, is as follows:
1. the common feeling of danger (in the context of privatization) contributed to joint
efforts; although it was not properly perceived by all, the lack of joint coordinated
efforts endangered management with loosing its positions, it forecasted trade unions'
loosing their membership and offered the employees the perspective of loosing their
jobs.
2. the old (and new) managements and unions were equally faced with deficits in their
legitimacy: both of them had to prove that they were able to cope with the new
di~culties; an obvious way to approach this target was to try to find solutions by
joint efforts;
3. open conflicts, when the companies were faced with grave economic difficulties,
promised limited success, as workers demands, even if considered as justified, could
not be met; at the same time they were detrimental for the company's image and
harmful for its market positions and involved the risk of outer (political) interven-
tion;
4. company top management and trade union leadership (the majority of whom had
been trained by the earlier system) were instinctively cooperative, they evaded
conflicts; many of the management, in its way, assumed trade union philosophies
while the workers' organisation behaved and argued like employers. "42
5. national level industrial relations had their impact felt too: they were mostly
cooperative; it was a pattern to follow up by management and unions that the
government and the trade union confederations continued to cooperate (or at least to
talk to each other) in the NCRI despite all of the conflicts which occurred in their
relationship in 1991192.
42 On the side of the unions such an attitude was perceived in the textile industry. (The Textile
Workers' Union) "has sent out letters to test its local organisations as to their attitudes concerning
negotiations about guaranteed minimum wages. The answers were as if given by employers: a
growth in minimum wages is unwanted as it would add to unemployment, it would risk with the
bankruptcy of the company, it would contribute to wage distortions etc. There was a textile
company where the minimum wage had not been raised to the legally guaranteed level of 8000
HUFlmonth and nothing happened... The attitudes of other unions outside of MSZOSZ were not
differing either..." Orolin, Zs.: Vegyesvállalatok munkaugyi kapcsolatai. (Industrial relations of
joint ventures) Munkaugyi Szemle, Budapest, No 12I1992. p. 11.
30
6. market economy ideals (primarily the Austrian and German models) also confirmed
cooperative attitudes.
Economic and political pressure
When we started to discuss the transformation of enterprise level industrial relations our
question was: whether economic or political determination had stronger impact in this field?
For this question, on the basis of what was revealed by our case studies, there exist no
alternative answers. Industrial relations at the companies - the contacts between employers
and emt)lovees - seem to reflect the interrelate.d and conrrnversial infl~aenCe nf bnrh arnnnmi~
and political change. At the same time autonomous developments depending on the
characteristics of the particular companies (and their particular industrial relations practices)
seem to have growing importance. The increased autonomy of business organizations
indicates the gradual extrication of their industrial relations from outside political and
ideological pressure.
Economic determination, i.e. the impact by transformation and privatization on enterprise
level industrial relations, seems to be basically indirect: ownership change in itself - that is
the substitution of the state as owner by quasi-private or private owners - does not result
necessarily in the transformation of industrial relations: structural changes in production,
technology, organisation, employment - started by or speeded-up by ownership change - are
rather those factors that seem to reshape the relations of employers and employees. The
trade unions' positions - according to international experience" - are very much dependent
also just on such structural developments. The direct impact by ownership change - such as
the industrial relations philosophy of the new owners and their attitude e.g. towards the
labour organisations - may be felt, but seem to be of minor importance. The question is: to
what extent transformation and privatization were followed up (or prepared) by those
`~ The decline in the level of unionization, as it is widely known, can be attributed to such
structural changes as the growth of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), the growth of
employment in services and its decline in traditional industries, technological development and the
reduction of classical manual jobs, the spread of atypical work (part-time work) etc.
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inevitable structural changes which were badly needed in the (past) state-owned socialist
enterprises to secure their competitiveness and after all their survival?
At the three companies (before their transformation and privatization) large redundancies had
been accumulated involving heavy burdens in terms of costs. At the (future) ComaseclRespi-
rator, due to its quasi-military production, such redundancies had existed in the capacity of
machinery, in stocks, in buildings, in land and - above all - in employment. DUNAFERR
and MALÉV (as referred to above had similar redundancies adding to their costs. In this
context it was an interesting phenomenon that only ComaseclRespirator - the only company
behaving as a genuine private enterprise - started to eliminate its redundancies and to cut it
costs - in employment too - while the other two - quasi-private or state owned - companies
(willingly or unwillingly) mostly maintained the earlier state of affairs."
At DUNAFERR and MALÉV the maintenance of (over) employment seemed to be a major
foundation of cooperation between management and unions. For this phenomenon the
following hypothetical explanation can be formulated: 1) The managements, feeling insecure
in their positions, were hesitant to reduce redundancies; such a move appeared premature for
them before it was actually made necessary by the ownership change and~or economic
constraints 2) Both steel production and aviation were highly capital-intensive activities, i.e.
in production costs wage costs had a relatively low share the reduction of which could not
remedy the two companies' economic and financial troubles. 3) Employment was a sensitive
political issue: DUNAFERR provided for the living of a medium-sized Hungarian town;
MALÉV's labour force (e.g. pilots) had no alternative options in the labour market; its
middle-management and administrative staff (as well as its traditional union) traditionally had
good outside informal connections and was in the position to "pull strings" to resist
" The transformation of state property into quasi-private property is evaluated by M. Tardos
as follows: "The process of so-called "spontaneous privatization" whereby state firms are transfor-
med into state~wned partnerships is positive in that the mazket value of the capital is determined,
dividends are paid on shares, and proprietors have cleaz expectations. Transformation has created
however a system of cross ownership between state firms, where the new proprietors, the leading
managers of the joint stock or limited liability company, and the employers are all interested in
converting the firm's capital into personal income and in consuming it." Tardos, M.: Property
Relations in the Period of Transition. In: Dallago, B. et al. (Eds.): Privatization and Entrepre-
neurship in Post Socialist Countries. Economy, Law and Society. p. 63.
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dismissal. Mass lay-offs - as both DUNAFERR and MALÉV would have been followed up
by the press and mass media - were likely to be transformed into national political issues 4)
Both companies were much dependent on the government. Managers were appointed by state
agencies, their Supervisory Boards and Boards of Directors were dominated by political
nominees. In case of DUNAFERR it was an issue of a(future) political decision whether it
would be bailed out of its debts. - In such a situation mass lay~ffs (even if they were
justified from the point cost reduction) could involve unforeseeable risks for the manage-
ments.d5
Internal structural changes ( even if they could be considered as insufficient) started at both
DUNAFERR and MALÉV and they wPrP likejy to lead to gradual cuts iï~ ïediindaiicies
(Employment already slightly declined at both companies.) A sign of such changes was
DUNAFERR's disintegration into a set of quasi-independent limited liability firms function-
ing as profit centres: the registration of costs and profits on the level of these firms could be
looked upon as a first step towards rationalization. At DUNAFERR serious debates took
place among the new limited liability companies about internal prices: those which appeared
as sellers on the market tried to exercise pressure to harmonize internal prices with those in
the market. DUNAFERR's (earlier) maintenance plant became the first victim of these
changes: the other units proved to be unwilling to pay the high prices it charged. At
MALÉV, although very few effective changes happened at the mother company, the
separation of the maintenance unit (and its turning into a JV) was also an initial step towards
rationalization.
The above structural changes (related with transformation and privatization) had an impact
also on industrial relations, as they involved a decentralisation or separation of the emplo-
yer's functions. ComaseclRespirator became absolutely independent, as for its industrial
relations too, the partial ownership of MEDICOR had no importance for developments in
`~ Mass lay offs were treated cautiously even by the managements of large joint venture
companies such as TUNGSRAM-General Electric. (Neumann, op.cit.) DUNAFERR and
MALÉV, their efforts to maintain employment, make us suppose that overemployment continues
to exist in the whole of the national economy, despite the current 12-13 ~ rate of unemployment.
Such redundancies have not decreased, but rather increased in the past years, as both the GDP and
industrial output have considerably declined.
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this field any more. A similar change took place at MALÉV, by the establishment of
Aeroplex, with the exception that the mother company - in its quality as one of the
proprietors - continued to play an active role in industrial relations. (It actively influenced
e.g. the wage negotiation process in August 1993). At DUNAFERR, the company's
Headquarters retained its "coordinating functions" also in the field of industrial relations: its
aim was to maintain a well-balanced situation among the limited liability companies (e.g. as
to wage levels and structures). In its efforts it relied on the collective "framework" agree-
ment, which covered all of its firms, and tried to make use of its own Works Council
too.`~
Political determination also had its strong impact felt on company level industrial relations
developments. By it I do not mean the direct presence of politics as it had occurred in the
past political regime, via the ruling Communist Party's organisations functioning at the
enterprises and the management being dependent on the local (and higher) party organs: this
dependence actually and legally had arrived at an end in Autumn 1989. (It was then that the
Communist Party collapsed and the Parliament prohibited the functioning of any political
party at the workplace). The political determination, I refer to, was indirect. Firstly, the
Government (and Parliament) had an active and decisive role in the process of transform-
ation and privatization. Secondly, in the initial phase of privatization, the state continued to
function as the major owner and the major (indirect) employer. Third, struggles in national
industrial relations - having an impact on the enterprises - had a basically political motiv-
ation and were closely interrelated with political struggles. Fourth, labour legislation
reshaping industrial relations, was born in a process of political decision-making. Company
level actors - managers, trade union activists, employees - even if they were not fully aware
of such determination - acted under the shadow of politics.
~ Works Councils, according to the law, could be established in those units of the enterprises
where the management was endowed with the employer's rights. In this way in the big limited
liability companies of DUNAFERR Works Councils were elected on two hierarchical level. A
Works Council was also elected at the Headquarters: as the latter had no employer's rights over
the employees of the limited liability companies its Works Council could not be provided with
general coordinating functions.
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Transformation in the political and industrial relations system had an asynchronism. The
possession of political power (and the major directions of further political changes) were
decided (at least for a four year period) by the 1990 elections. In industrial relations,
however, major dilemmas continued to exist: who would be the employers and which unions
would be the workers' representatives (in the coming four years and after)? In addition,
there were grave tensions in the relationship of the government, the legislation and the trade
unions. While in the political arena the governing Conservative coalition was faced with a
Liberal and Socialist opposition, in the trade union arena the reformed old and the newly
formed workers' organisations were opposed to each other. Another asynchronism in the
relationship of the political and industrial relations system lied in the (open or tacit) political
affiliations of the unions. Most important confederations (MSZOSZ, the League etc.l had
links with political parties in the opposition, while the governing coalition had no such
partners on the unions' side which shared its political and ideological values and rendered it
support." This situation - and the painful lack of clear industrial relations philosophies -
offer an explanation for the uncertainties and contradictions of the government's and
parliament's attitude towards the trade unions.~
The Government's (and Parliament's) trade union policies were double faced in the whole
period investigated: they were pragmatic and at the same time ideological. It was pragma-
tism e.g. which made the government to revive the tripartite National Council of the
Reconciliation of Interests (in Summer 1990), to engage in talks with all of the existing trade
union confederations in this body and in this way to accept de facto all of them as legitimate
and representative; negotiations in the NCRI were continued even in the period of sharp
" Among the trade union confederations MOSZ (Workers' Councils) had the closest links
with the Government (and the major coalition party, the Hungarian Democratic Forum); its efforts
to promote workers' self management - following up the example of the short lived Workers
Councils of 1956 - collided, however, with the privatisation philosophy of the Government. In
1992 there was a(politically motivated) attempt to set up a christian trade union confederation
(KESZOSZ); it participated in the Social Security Boards elections, but was not accepted by the
other confederations as a member of the NCRI.
`~ For more details, see: Bruszt, L. Gondolatok a gazdasagi kapcsolatok rendszerér8l.
(Reflections on the Industrial Relations System); Héthy, L.: Tripartizmus: lehet8ség vagy illuzió?
('Tripartism: is it a chance or an illusion?) Társadalmi Szemle, Budapest, No 2. 1993.
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confrontations between the government and part of the unions (1991-92). At the same time,
the Government (and Parliament) interfered into trade union affairs and subjected the labour
organisations - as referred to above - to repeated tests of legitimacy and representativeness:
these measures, most probably, were not free of ideological (and political) motivations. It is
a challenging task for political analysts to reveal how the political pressure exercised by the
Government contributed to the consolidation of the workers organizations in 1993 with
MSZOSZ retaining its predominance among them.
The explanation for the success of MSZOSZ on national level (and of its a~liates at the
companies investigated) partly is in their internal reforms and efforts; but these workers'
organisation could not (and did not) become overnight "genuine trade unions". Their public
support also originated - I risk this statement although there is no empirical evidence to
prove it - from the general political mood as well as from the past habits of the employees
and of the population in general. The old reformed trade unions' cooperative behaviour -
even if it was in a sense a direct continuation of past practices - seemed to fit more
adequately the present conditions of state-controlled transformation than those alternative
confrontational attitudes - based on abstract market economy ideals - by which the newly
formed unions hoped to attract members and supporters. If cooperation is a must on
company (and on national) level, cooperative actors and behaviours seem to be preferred.
Perspectives - before and after privatisation
Privatisation is a complex process: the concept itself is not defined properly. In a wider
sense, it indicates the development of the private sector; it has two major components; firstly
it means the establishment of new private firms, secondly it involves the giving of state
assets to private hands. New private companies are mostly small private undertakings - the
number of which has been rapidly growing - but they include big "greenfield" investments
by multinationals too (such as Ford, Suzuki, etc.) The establishment of new undertakings
usually relies on capital investment - but state assets also function as capital (as in the case
of the JV's of MALÉV and DUNAFERR). Privatization, in a narrower sense, indicates the
selling of state owned enterprises (assets) to private investors. This type of privatization,
however, is often associated with capital investment too. (The example is MALÉV). From
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the point of industrial relations the way of privatization seems to have an importance:
1. The newly established private firms have genuine private owner(s) and a manage-
ment dependent on it (them); the privatization of state owned enterprises, on the
conuary, often leads to quasi-private ownership (partial or full state ownership) with
a politically dependent management.
2. The newly established private firms are free to choose - within the limits set by
labour legislation - of how to build up their industrial relations; privatized state-0w-
ned companies, on the contrary, have a legacy also in industrial relations (e.g. the
trade unions, collective agreements etc).
The companies, investigated in our case studies, represent a particular group of firms from
the aspect of privatization; they are past big state companies in which the state's ownership
has been (partly or fully) maintained. They can be found, however, in differing phases of
privatization and internal restructuring. Comasec~Respirator (although MEDICOR still is a
proprietor in it) seems to be a genuine private company, under the control of the foreign
owner and the Hungarian management depending on him. (That is why our investigation was
limited to it and neglected MEDICOR.) MALÉV's (partial) privatization was carried out in
the period of our research: the state maintained its majority ownership and the Italian
investor (ALITALIA) is a state company itself too. At DUNAFERR privatization (except for
its JVs) is a possible option for the future: it is an open question - taking into consideration
the international recession in the steel industry and the company's debts - whether it can be
sold at all. The differing stages (and ways) of privatization had a role most probably in the
differing industrial relations developments at the three companies:
1. At ComaseclRespirator a"silent collapse" of collective industrial relations49 has
taken place: formally the collective model has continued to exist, but informally it
49 Collective industrial relations mean that employment relationship is based on a collective
contract (concluded by the employer and trade union); in individualized industrial relations
employment relationship - in lack of collective agreement and usually of trade union - is based on
individual work contracts.
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has been substituted by managerial paternalism; the future of the trade union seems
to be doubtful.
2. At MALÉV industrial relations developments - after privatization - have azrived into
an exciting phase: the trade unions and the collective model seem to be consolidated;
at the same time interests of employees are clearly articulated and effectively
represented - as indicated by the work stoppages of 1993; at present the trade unions
aze in the position to take the initiative while the management seems to be
undetermined; conflicts are frequent.
3. DUNAFERR's privatization and future is burdened by uncertainties; collective
industrial relations continue to live on; the relations of management and unions can
be described as"pragmatic cooperation" or "mutual tolerance"; this model and
contacts most probably will survive until radical changes occur in the position of the
company: at present there aze no such signs.
In research, relying on case studies, the generalisation of findings always is a major
dilemma. In 1992 the Japan Institute of Labour - in cooperation with our Labour Research
Institute - carried out a survey (based on a questionnaire) about company level industrial
relations in 446 big Hungarian enterprises. According to its (preliminary) results the major
diffculties the enterprises were faced with were: shrinking markets (94 l), the collapse of
Comecon trade (32 ~o), the lack of capital (70 ~o). Their answers to these problems included
changes in business policies (78 ~o), reduction of labour force (75 ~ó), reorganisation (72
9'0 ), speeding-up privatization (67 ~). Transformation ( into economic association) was
completed or was underway at 70 9~ at the them. Most firms (85 9) had trade unions,
MSZOSZ member organisations were present at 70 qo of the companies. Where workers
representation was pluralized, the unions made efforts to maintain - an often institutionalized
- dialogue. The management, in such cases, had contacts with all of the unions; there were
no signs of discriminatory policies. At several firms such contacts were institutionalized
(local bodies for the "reconciliation of interests" were set up.) The managers, according to
their own reports, consulted workers' representatives in most critical issues of transform-
ation (such as mass lay-offs, privatization). Wages and social benefits remained in the focus
of labour disputes and a growing concern was found as to job security too. Labour disputes
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rarely led to industrial action: strikes occurred only at 13 ~o of the firms.~
A major question for the future is: whether the subsequent phases of transformation and
privatization necessarily result in the process we have registered at the three companies?
Whether the collective models of industrial relations of DUNAFERR, MALÉV and other
state owned or quasi-private companies - after privatization is completed - will necessarily be
substituted by quasi-collective or individualized models? In other words: it the "silent
collapse" of collective industrial relations - what was found at ComaseclRespirator - an
inevitable perspective of the future? In general: are apocalyptic visions forecasting the
collapse of collective industrial relations justified?
I think that in certain groups of firms there is a chance that trade unions disappear (or fail to
organize membership) and individual industrial relations prevail.S' Such a danger is
involved, according to some experts, in the appearance and increasing influence of multi-
nationals and of home investors having an interest in short term profit maximization,
supported by strong political forces.S2 Even if we are aware of such a trend, we should not
~ The Japan Institute of Labour: Munkaugyi viszonyok Magyarországon. Kibontakozásuk a
poszt-szocialista társadalomban. (Industrial Relations in Hungary. Their Development in the
Post-Socialist Society.) Tokyo, July 1993.
s' Industrial relations of various groups of firms considerably differ; a major feature of small
private undertakings including joint ventures, according to the information at our disposal, is the
absence of trade unions (and collective bargaining). A 1991 survey of 165 joint ventures found
that only 8 9'o had unions. Kaucsek, Gy. - Poór J. - Ternovszky, F.: Kis és kázepes méretí3
magyarországi vegyesvállalatok menedzselésének, munkaugyi tevékenységének jellemz8i.
(Management and Human Resource Practices of Small and Medium-Sized Joint Ventures in
Hungary.) Ipargazdaság, Budapest, No 2-3. 1992. The local plants of multinationals pursue very
much differing practices as dictated by the philosophy of their management, by their legacy etc.
Some of them e.g. have no trade unions (Ford, Levi's, McDonald's) while labour organisations
are present at others ('TUNGSRAM-General Electric, Hungarian Suzuki, GM-Hungaria, etc.) For
details, see: Neumann, L.: et al.: Labour Management Relations and Human Resource Practices
in Foreign and Multinational Enterprises. The Hungarian Experience. OECD Meeting of Experts,
Budapest, 14-15 June, 1993.
sZ Csákó enlists the following major obstacles to positive developments: 1) Institutions have
been established on the basis of theoretical and political considerations having little to do with
actual industrial relations practices. 2) The new strong economic actors enjoying political support
are opposed to the democratization of industrial relations. 3) People are suspicious as to their
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forget: 1) In the course of privatization investors' industrial relations philosophies may much
differ: they are not necessazily hostile to collective industrial relations; 2) The Hungarian
management has an important role, both before and after privatization, in shaping the
managementltrade union relationship; its important groups seem to assume a cooperative
attitude 3) The consolidation of labour relations actors (primarily unions), institutions and
labour legislation (until 1993) set limits to voluntary actions on the part of the employers. In
1991192 new investors (employers), in a situation of transition, had an almost unlimited
freedom to act on their own: in our days it is far from being so.
Our empirical knowledge of current firm-level industrial relations is too limited to provide a
well-founded general description. Instead I limit myself to the formulation of a couple of
vague remazks: a) no uniform company level model seems to exist: industrial relations can
be characterized by a wide vaziety, their patterns are differing in various groups of firms but
also within such groups, b) the differences are related with the gradual extrication of the
firms and their industrial relations from the stranglehold of politics and ideology c)
developments of company level industrial relations can be characterized by the double
concepts of continuity and change; d) industrial relations - due to the relative consolidation
of actors, institutions and legal rules - have assumed a certain stability; e) privatization (and
related internal restructuring) seem to be a major force in shaping the relationship of
employers and employees; this process, however, has not had its full impact felt as yet.
Summing up: we aze faced with such a moving and changing - although relatively stable -
system for the future of which neither extremely optimistic nor pessimistic forecasts seem to
be properly justified.
1993, December
institutionalized representation and fears of powerful bureaucracies have deep roots in their
thinking. Csákó, M.: A magyarországi munkaugyi viszonyok átalakulásának egyes akadályairól.
(Obstacles to the Transformation of Labour Relations in Hungazy.) Szociológiai Szemle, Budapest,
No 4. 1992. On the basis of our own research project and other studies I cannot shaze Csákó's
general pessimism as for the future of industrial relations.
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Appendix
THE POSITIONS OF TRADE UNION CONFEDERATIONS IN HUNGARY
Confederation Membership Social Security Board Elections Works Council-Public Servant
(April 1991) (Spring 1993) (May 1993) Council Elections (May 1993)
thousand thousand Health Insurance Pension Insurance Works Councils Public Servant
Board Board Councils









1200 45.2 15 50.1 18 71.7 9.4
550 8.4 2 10.6 3 - 49.1
410 5.3 1 4.8 1 18.6 0.5
250 13.1 4 10.1 3 5.7 4.9
160 12.8 4 10.9 3 2.2 0.2
110 6.8 2 6.2 2 1.0 7.2
8.4 2 7.3 2
Notes:
~ After the renewal of check-off authorizations (1991 Autumn) MSZOSZ reported 1,9 million members.
~~ The rest of the votes were received by candidates of non-affiliated unions and independent candidates. In Public Servant Councils elections indepent
candidates had a considerable share (26.6 3'0) in votes.
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